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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION IN MISSOURP
Wujffrm F. FRATCHER**

Probably the most interesting decision of the period under review
1 involving the effect of a provision imposing
was that in Cox v. Fisher,
forfeiture for contest. Settlor transferred property to a trustee to be held
for the benefit of the settlor during his lifetime and thereafter for others.
An amendment to the trust instrument provided, "if any beneficiary
under this trust shall contest the validity thereof . .. such person shall

thereby be deprived of all beneficial interest." After the execution of this
amendment the settlor was placed under guardianship because of mental
incompetence. The guardian and some of the beneficiaries, who were also
prospective heirs of the settlor, joined as plaintiffs in an unsuccessful suit
to set aside the trust and the amendment on the ground that the
settlor was mentally incompetent at the times of their execution. After
the settlor's death the trustee sued for a declaratory judgment as to
whether these beneficiaries had forfeited their interests under the trust.
The supreme court determined that they had not, holding that the
forfeiture provision should be construed narrowly. As so construed, the
forfeiture provision did not apply to the suit to set aside the trust because
the beneficiaries, as mere prospective heirs, had no standing as plaintiffs
in that suit, the settlor himself being the only true plaintiff.
In a majority of states a provision in a will or trust instrument that
a beneficiary who contests the validity of the instrument shall forfeit his
interest thereunder is deemed invalid as to a contest instituted in good
faith with probable cause.2 The majority rule is based upon the propositions that persons guilty of forgery, fraud or undue influence ought not
to be able to protect their ill-gotten gains by threats of punishment
against those who seek to reveal their wrongdoing and that the interests

*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1958 and 1959 Missouri court
decisions.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri; Member of the Michigan and Missouri

Bars.

1. 322 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1959).
2. Annots., 157 A.L.R. 596 (1945); 146 A.L.R. 1211 (1943); 125 AJLR. 1135 (1940);
67 A.L.R. 52 (1930). BROWDER, Illegal Conditions and Limitations, 6 Ass cA LAW
oF PaoFRTY §§ 27.4, .6 (Casner ed. 1952).
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of public justice demand that no one should be penalized for a good-faith
attempt to secure justice in the courts of the land. Missouri follows a
minority view, under which such forfeiture provisions are enforced even
if the contest is instituted in good faith and upon probable cause. 8 It has
been observed that the minority rule penalizes an innocent beneficiary
for refusing to become, morally, a party to and recipient of the benefits
of what he honestly believes to be forgery, fraud, undue influence or the
work of a diseased mind. 4 In the instant case the court continued its
adherence to the minority rule that good faith and probable cause in
the institution of the contest are irrelevant but the decision offers
some hope that the court will eventually abandon this vicious rule.
Sando v. Phillips5 may be the last proceeding in this state for
assignment of dower. The Missouri Probate Code abolished dower but
did not affect any estate which vested prior to January 1, 1956.0 In this
case the parties and the court assumed that the widow of a man who
died in 1955 was entitled to dower. Whether the statute effectively
abolishes dower in cases where the husband was seized during the marriage prior to January 1, 1956 but died thereafter was not discussed or
decided. It probably does. 7 Thus passes, with scant notice, one of the
basic rights guaranteed by Magna Carta.8
The mediaeval theory of dower was based upon two simple and
seemingly self-evident propositions: (1) a faithful wife should be
guaranteed a share in her husband's estate sufficient to ensure her comfortable support, and (2) the property should return to the family after
her death. Land was the principal type of wealth and common law dower,
the widow's right to a life estate in a third of her husband's land, con-

3. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed, 318 S.W.2d 289 (1958); Rossi v. Davis, 345
Mo. 362, 133 S.W.2d 363 (1939).

4. Rouse v. Branch, 91 S.C. 111, 74 S.E. 133 (1911), quoted in In re Estate of
Cocklin, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945). In the latter case the Iowa supreme
court shifted from the minority to the majority rule.
5. 319 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1959). Cf. Chapman v, Corbin, 316 S.W.2d 880 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1958) in which a post-nuptial property settlement, executed prior to the enactment of the Missouri Probate Code, in which the wife waived any interest in
her husband's property, barred dower. Compare Ellis v. Williams, 312 S.W.2d 97
(Mo. 1958). Section 474.220, RSMo 1957 Supp. provides for similar waiver of marital
rights under the Probate Code.
6. § 474.110, RSMo 1957 Supp.
7. ScuRLocK, RETROAcTIVE LEGISLATION AcTING INTEPESTs IN LAND 285-95
(1953).
8. C. 7 (1215); restated and elaborated, 9 Hen. III, c. 7 (1225).
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formed to both of these propositions.9 In modem society, with a major
part of wealth classified as personal property, common law dower,
limited to real property, is inadequate protection for widows. Hence
there has been a tendency to enact legislation giving widows interests
in their husbands' personal property which cannot be defeated by will.
New York has done this without departure from either of the mediaeval
propositions. There a widow cannot elect to take against her husband's
will if it gives her the income from a third of the estate for her life.' 0
Missouri, in creating a modem substitute for dower, has, unfortunately,
neglected the second proposition, that the property should return to
the family after the widow's death. If a man's widow is the mother of all
of his children, has no children by any other man, and does not remarry,
the new Missouri statutes are unlikely to result in permanent diversion
of property from the family. If his widow is not the mother of his children, the possible results of the Missouri Probate Code provisions can
best be described by a novelette, which we shall entitle,
In re Estate of Joseph Sedley, Deceased
Joseph Sedley and Amelia, his devoted wife, celebrated their golden
wedding anniversary with a grand reception put on by their two beloved
sons, Peter and John, their daughters-in-law and their eight grandchildren. Just a month later Amelia died, leaving Joseph heartbroken and
lonely. Peter and John and their wives offered to take him into their
homes but Joseph wanted to stay on the old home place. Peter and John
inquired in town as to a housekeeper for their father. Several friends
mentioned Becky Sharp. One of them remarked that she was young and
had been known to associate with that scamp from the reform school,
George Osborne, before he joined the Army, but said that she was known
as a hard worker. Becky asked for surprisingly low wages so Peter and
John employed her without further inquiry.
Peter and John had been doing most of their father's farm work, in

9. Prior to the fourteenth century a widow was also guaranteed a third of her
husband's personal property and this right could not be defeated by his will.
ATxmsox, Wmrs 15-16 (2d ed. 1953). She took the full title to personal property,
not merely a life estate, but it should be remembered that the personal property of

that period was tangible--food, clothing, furniture, farm implements and livestock-

and unlikely to outlast a human life. Stocks, bonds and the other modern types
of intangible personal property which are not consumed and do not wear out were,

in the main, unknown.

10. N.Y. DEcE. EST. LAW § 18(b). This is its effect in the average case.
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addition to running their own farms, for several years and they continued to do so. Before Becky's arrival, they and their families had spent
much of their time at the old home place. After Becky took over, the old
house was kept in excellent condition but their welcome there gradually
grew colder. After awhile they only went to the house for short Sunday
calls. These ceased to be enjoyable as it became increasingly evident that
Joseph Sedley had become putty in the hands of his efficient young
housekeeper. Peter and John decided to ask their father to discharge
Becky and went to the old home place one Sunday afternoon with this
in mind. They were met by their father's shamefaced announcement that
he had married Becky Sharp the night before.
Six weeks after his second marriage Joseph Sedley died, leaving a
Will which gave his widow a life estate in enough of his property to ensure
her comfortable support for life and the residue to his sons. Becky
promptly elected to take against the will' and soon married George
Osborne, who had secured his dishonorable discharge from the Army
after a term at Leavenworth.
Now let us see what, under the Missouri Probate Code, becomes of
the property which Joseph and Amelia Sedley acquired by fifty years
of hard work. First, Becky receives an allowance for a year's support
according to her previous standard of living as Mrs. Joseph Sedley. 1 2
We may assume that this will be five thousand dollars cash and that
Becky and George Osborne will use it to finance their foreign honeymoon. Next, Becky receives "the family bible and other books, all wearing apparel of the family, all household electrical appliances, all household musical instruments and all household and kitchen furniture, appliances, utensils and implements."' 3 So the rare old Bible which Hezekiah Sedley brought to Virginia in 1673 will have its pages used to light
George Osborne's cigars. The fine library which Joseph's bachelor
brother Tom, the minister, left to Joseph in order to keep it in the Sedley
family is now the property of Becky Sharp Sedley Osborne. The quaint
parlor organ, the walnut cradle and the antique grandfather's clock
which Jacob Sedley carried over the mountains from Virginia in a covered
wagon are also Becky's. Even -the china and silver which were Amelia

11.
12.
13.

§ 474.160, RSMo 1957 Supp.
§ 474.260, RSMo 1957 Supp.
§§ 474.160 250, RSMo 1957 Supp.
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Sedley's wedding gifts and which she intended to go to her granddaughters, 14 the quilts which she made during the long winter evenings
and her hand-embroidered pillow cases will grace the home of Becky
and George Osborne. Lastly, Becky takes a third of everything left of
the property of Joseph Sedley, including the old home place, in fee
simple absolute.15 Becky's wages were not so low after all.
George Osborne's tavern companions have a new name for the
lissouri Probate Code. They call it "The Golddigger's Dream Come
True."
CONRACTS TO AM

WILLS

Fisherv. Cox 16 involved an oral promise by an uncle to devise a farm
to his nephew in consideration of the nephew's promise to occupy the
farm, pay taxes, and pay the uncle $150 a year. The nephew performed
his promise and made substantial improvements. The uncle executed
a will devising the farm to the nephew but later conveyed it to the
defendant trustee. At suit of the nephew, commenced after the uncle's
death, the trustee was compelled to convey the farm to the nephew, apparently on the ground that the oral contract to devise was taken out
of the Statute of Frauds by part performance.
In Glueck v. McMehen' 7 a husband and wife executed a joint will
giving all of the property of the first to die to the survivor and the property of the survivor to named devisees. After the death of the husband
the wife conveyed land which had been owned by the entirety to the
defendants in consideration of a promissory note secured by a purchase
money deed of trust. The wife later released the note and deed of trust
without consideration. At suit of the wife's executor the release was set
aside upon the basis of evidence of ambiguous oral statements by the
wife indicating that she may have agreed with her husband not to
change the will. In some states it is held that the mere making of a joint

14. Because of § 474.250, RSMo 1957 Supp. Amelia could not bequeath even
souvenirs from her china, books, linens and household goods to her grandchildren
or anyone else. They all went to her surviving husband without regard to her wishes.
15. 474.160, RSMo 1957 Supp.
16. 312 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. 1958). This case is related to Cox v. Fisher, supra
note 1. Cf. Jackson v. Tibbling, 310 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958), discussed below, holding
that an oral contract to devise land was unenforcible because of the Statute of Frauds.
See also cases discussed in Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missourio-1957,23 Mo.
L. Rsv. 467, 473 (1958).
17. 318 S.W.2d 371 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
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and reciprocal will implies a contract by the survivor not to revoke.18
The Missouri supreme court has wisely rejected this view and held that
adequate evidence of the making and content of a real contract is essential to its enforcement. 19 Particularly in view of the fact that the
property involved in this case did not pass to the wife by the joint will,
the finding by the court that there was a contract inhibiting inter vivos
transfer is difficult to reconcile with the supreme court decisions.
VALIDITY OF WILLS
20

Strahl v. Turner involved a contention that a person is incompetent
to be a subscribing witness to a will unless he observes and judges the
mental capacity of the testator. The court properly and clearly rejected
this contention, holding that, while failure to observe and judge the
mental capacity of the testator impairs the credibility of the testimony of
a witness on the issue of testamentary capacity, it has no bearing on
competency to be a subscribing witness to a will or a testifying witness
in a will contest. The opinion, unfortunately, contains language suggesting that publication by the testator is required for execution of a
will.2 1 Publication, that is, an announcement by the testator to the wit-

nesses that the instrument is his will, is a required part of the execution
of a will in New York and some other states. It has never been required
in Missouri.
McCaleb v. Shantz22 involved the validity of a devise of land to a
business corporation. The Missouri constitution provides, "No corporation... shall... hold any real estate except such as is necessary and
proper for carrying on its legitimate business .,."23 The residuary devisees contended that this provision made the corporation incapable of
taking title, so that the devise to it was void and fell into the residue,
18. E.g., Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315 (1949); Frazier v. Patterson,
243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909).

19. Hart v. Hines, 263 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953) (contract not to revoke joint
will, if any, did not prevent inter vivos conveyance by survivor of property held
by the entirety); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914).
20. 310 S.W.2d 833 (Mo..1958). In Black v. City Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d
477 (Mo. 1959), a prisoner in a Texas penal institution mailed a petition contesting
a will to the Missouri probate court which had admitted it to probate within the time
allowed for contest. He filed another petition in the circuit court after the time for

contest had expired. It was held that neither petition could be considered because
the probate court had no jurisdiction of will contests and the limitation on time
for contest in the circuit court applied to prisoners.

21. 310 S.W.2d at 839-40.
22. 318 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1958).
23. Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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citing a case in which a clause of the 1875 constitution was so construed. 24
It was held that the constitutional provision does not incapacitate a corporation from taking title to land by devise or otherwise and that it is
enforceable only at the suit of the state. As the opinion observes, such
constitutional provisions have been variously interpreted. There is considerable authority for the interpretation made in this case.25
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

In Uphaus v. Uphaus 26 a testator with four children devised a farm
to his son Jesse for life and provided, "at the death of my said son, . . .
there shall be paid to his wife.... if she shall survive him, the sum of
...
[$3,000] out of the real estate so devised to my said son, Jesse, and
the remainder in said real estate, after the expiration of the life estate
of my said son, Jesse, and after the payment of the said sum of . . .
[$3,000] shall go to and descend equally to the rest of my children or
their descendants, share and share alike, per stirpes."2 7 The court, emphasizing the constructional preference for early vesting, 2 8 determined
that the remainder vested in the three children of the testator, other
than Jesse, at the death of the testator. Only possession, not vesting, was
postponed until the death of Jesse. Consequently, when Jesse's brother
died, Jesse took a share in the remainder as heir of his brother.
Thomas v. Higginbotham29 involved the will of a testator who died in
1905. It devised an undivided half of the testator's land to his son Robert,
remainder to Robert's children, but if Robert should die without surviving issue in the lifetime of testator's son Charles, to Charles for life
"and at his death vest absolutely in his heirs at law." 30 The other undivided half was devised to Charles, with reciprocal remainder provisions in favor of Robert and his heirs. Robert died in 1935 without
24. Proctor v. Board of Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 225 Mo.
51, 123 S.W. 862 (1907). The provision there involved prohibited the establishment

of a religious corporation except for the purpose only of holding title to land for
church edifices, parsonages and cemeteries.

25. Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174 (1882). Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum,
194 Mass. 280 (1907);
26. 315 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1958).
27. Id. at 803.
28. See Fratcher, Trusts and Succession, 22 Mo. L. REv. 390, 400 (1957).
29. 318 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1958). Hunter v. Hunter, 320 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959), an
interesting and important will construction case, is discussed by Professor Eckhardt
in his Article on property. A complicated construction problem created by overlap-

ping land descriptions in two paragraphs of a will involved in Boxley v. Easter,
319 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. 1959).
30. 318 S.W.2d at 236.
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surviving issue. Charles died January 21, 1956 survived by his widow
and two children. Prior to 1956 a widow was not an heir of her husband.
The Missouri Probate Code, effective January 1, 1956, makes a widow an
heir of her husband.3 1 The question presented was whether the phrase
"heirs at law" in the devise of the ultimate remainder in Robert's half
to the heirs of Charles was to be applied according to its meaning at the
time of the testator's death in 1905 or according to its meaning at the
death of Charles in 1956. The court held that it meant heirs as defined
at the death of Charles, so Charles' widow took a share as her husband's
heir.
In Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed3 2 the will of a testator who died in
1927 bequeathed $100 to his son James, whose whereabouts were unknown to him, and devised the residue to a trustee to pay the income
to two daughters and a daughter-in-law and their children. When the
daughters and daughter-in-law died and all their children reached 21,
the trust was to terminate and the trust estate to "be divided, distributed,
and paid over to my lineal descendants, per stirpes. '33 The will provided
that if any beneficiary attempted to oppose the admission of the will to
probate or to have it set aside or declared invalid all bequests to that
beneficiary or his descendants should be null and void. The son, James
contested the will in 1928 on grounds of undue influence and lack of
testamentary capacity. This contest was settled by the payment of a relatively small sum to James and he died in 1942. One of testator's daughters adopted a child in 1909 and testator treated this child as a grandchild. A judgment determining that (1) the remainder to the lineal
descendants did not vest until the termination of the trust and they
should be ascertained at that time; (2) the descendants of James were
barred from taking by the no-contest clause even if his contest was instituted in good faith;3 4 and (3) the adopted child of the testator's daughter took as a lineal descendant of the testator, was affirmed. As to the
last point, the court conceded that an adopted child was not a lineal
descendant under the adoption statutes in force in 1909 and that the
1917 legislation, enlarging the rights of adopted children, applied only
to those adopted thereafter. It held, however, that 1943 legislation ex-

31. §§ 472.010 (14), 474.010, RSMo 1957 Supp.
32.

318 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1958).

33. Id. at 292.
34. See note 3 suprm and accompanying text.
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tending the 1917 legislation to persons adopted before its enactment
was applicable because the testat6r meant that the words "lineal descendants" should be applied according to their meaning at the time of
vesting and distribution rather than at the time of his death."5
ADMnusTRATioN or ESTATEs
In re Dugan 8 involved the appointment by a Missouri probate court

of an administrator of the estate of a decedent who was killed in a railroad accident in Kansas. The administrator commenced a wrongful
death action in Illinois against the railroad, which was a Missouri corporation. The railroad filed a motion in the probate court to cancel the
letters of administration on the ground that the decedent was a resident
of Kansas and the court lacked jurisdiction. The motion was overruled
and the circuit court dismissed an appeal on the ground the railroad
had no interest in the estate which entitled it to make the motion or
take the appeal from its denial. The court of appeals reviewed the provisions of the Missouri Probate Code and concluded that, under them,
a debtor to an estate does have sufficient interest to attack the appointment of the administrator on the ground that it is void.
State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross 37 was a prohibition proceeding. An
automobile collision in Missouri caused the death of a Missouri resident
in one car and those of the driver and owner of the other car, both of
whom were Nebraska residents. The widow of the Missouri decedent
commenced an action for wrongful death against the Nebraska administratrices of the Nebraska decedents in a Missouri circuit court. Summonses were served on the Missouri Secretary of State. A Missouri
statute, as amended in 195538 provides that a nonresident who operates
a motor vehilcle on a Missouri highway thereby agrees that he, his
executor or administrator, may be sued in Missouri for damages arising
from such operation, and appoints the Missouri Secretary of State agent
for him, his executor or administrator, to receive services of process.
Nebraska law prohibits wrongful death actions against administrators
and requires claims against decedents' estates to be filed in the court
with probate jurisdiction within a specified time. The widow's claim

35. Cf. Vreeland v. Vreeland, 296 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1956); Fratcher, supra note
28, at 397.
36. 309 S.W.2d 137 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).

37. 314 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
38.

§ 506.210, RSMo 1957 Supp.
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was not so filed. The supreme court held the statute valid and refused
to issue a writ of prohibition against prosecution of the action in the
circuit court. The opinion indicates that the effect of a judgment in such
an action in Nebraska is for determination by the courts of that state.
The Missouri statutes provide that causes of action for personal
injury shall not abate upon the death of the tort-feasor but except actions
for slander, libel, assault and battery and false imprisonment.80 Gray
v. Wallace40 was an action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The defendant died before trial and her administrator was substituted. It was held that the count for malicious prosecution did not
abate. Joyce v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp.41 confirms the view expressed
last year that a magistrate's court judgment ceases to have the effect
of a judgment if the defendant dies pending expiration of the time for
appeal.42 In the Joyce case it was held that the plaintiff who secured such
a judgment lost all rights against the defendant's estate and his liability
insurer by failing to file a claim in the probate court within the nonclaim period.
During the period under review there were a number of decisions
relative to claims against estates which turned on questions of competency and sufficiency of evidence4 3 and several decisions in proceedings by personal representatives for discovery of estate assets.44
CREATION, MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF TRUSTS

In Trotter v. Trotter45 a dairy clerk who unexpectedly inherited
$80,000 worth of corporate stock from an uncle, transferred it to a
trust company upon trust for his wife, his mother-in-law and himself

39. §§ 537.020, .030, RSMo 1949.
40. 319 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1958). Overstreet v. Overstreet, 319 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1958)
involved the effect of the death of a plaintiff who had taken a default judgment
canceling a deed of land.
41. 321 S.W.2d 272 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
42. See Fratcher, supra note 16, at 481-83 discussing State ex rel. White v.
Terte, 303 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
43. Taylor v. Commerce Trust Co., 319 S.W.2d 895 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959); Lenhardt's Estate v. Lenhardt, 322 S.W.2d 170 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959); Birdsong v. Estate
of Ladwig, 314 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958); Allmon v. Allmon, 314 S.W.2d 457
(Spr. Ct. App. 1958); Beckers-Behrens-Gist Lumber Co. v. Adams, 311 S.W.2d 70
(St. L. Ct. App. 1958); Sevier v. Staples' Estate, 309 S.W.2d 706 (K.C, Ct. App. 1957).
44. In re Kies' Estate, 320 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1959); In re North's Estate, 320 S.W.2d
597 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959); Covey v. Van Bibber, 311 S.W.2d 112 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958);
Bringer v. Barr, 318 S.W.2d 524 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
45. 316 S.W.2d 482 (Mo: 1958).
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for their lives and thereafter for charity. By the express terms of the
trust instruments they were irrevocable. After his wife divorced him;
the settlor sued to rescind the transfers on the ground that, at the time
of their execution, he thought they were revocable. A decree for the
plaintiff was reversed on the facts. The opinion is interesting in its
assumption that a settlor who creates a trust by transfer may rescind
for unilateral mistake of law.
Carlock v. Ladies Cemetery Ass'n 8 involved the effect of a devise
of Missouri land to "the Atlanta, Illinois, Cemetery." The cemetery
was established by the City of Atlanta for public use and transferred
by it to a non-profit Illinois corporation for operation. The trial court
determined that the devise created a valid trust for a public charity
and appointed a resident of Missouri4 7 trustee to sell the land and pay
over the proceeds to the Illinois corporation. The supreme court agreed
that the devise created a valid charitable trust but directed modification
to require the trustee to continue to administer the trust.
In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gatewood" the decedent carried two
policies of life insurance under which his wife was the beneficiary.
After their divorce, decedent executed a will bequeathing the residue
of his estate to the Citizens Bank as trustee for his children and designated the "Citizens Bank, Trustee of Estate of John J. Gatewood" as
beneficiary under the policies. He died five months after a second marriage. The second wife claimed marital rights in the proceeds of the
policy on the theory that the designation of beneficiary failed to create
an express -trust because of indefiniteness of beneficiaries and purpose
and, therefore, the bank held on resulting trust for the estate of the
decedent. The supreme court affirmed a judgment that the proceeds of
the policies passed to the Citizens Bank as trustee for the children,
free of marital rights, and not as part of the decedent's estate. The
opinion indicates that the designation of beneficiary created an inter
vivos trust which was definite as to beneficiaries and terms because it
incorporated by reference the provisions of the residuary clause of the
will.
46. 317 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1958).
47. This was necessary because, at the time the trial court acted, § 456.120, RSMo
1949 prohibited Illinois corporations from acting as trustees of Missouri land. This
section was modified in 1955 by §§ 363.205, 456.120, RSMo 1957 Supp.
48. 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958). This case followed Tootle-Lacy Natl Bank v.
Rollier, 341 Mo. 1029, 111 S.W.2d 12 (1937), which is a leading case.
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Butler State Bank v. Duncan49 not only recognized the Totten °
or tentative savings bank trust but construed language which seemed to
manifest a testamentary intent as creating a revocable inter vivos trust.
A mother deposited $8,000 in a saving account which she opened in the
name of herself "pable on deth" to her daughter. She later withdrew
some $3,000. It was held that the daughter was entitled to the balance
remaining in this account at the time of the mother's death. This result
may be sound but should it not have been reached on a theory of contract for the benefit of a third party rather than on a trust theory? The
transaction was very similar to the acquisition of a life insurance policy
designating a third party beneficiary but reserving to the insured power
to demand the cash value.
AimSTATION

OF TRUSTS

A charitable trust for the promotion of musical education was involved in Murphey v. Dalton.51 The will creating the trust was contested
on the ground that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The trustee employed a lawyer to oppose the will contest on a thirty per cent contingent
fee basis. The will contest having failed, the circuit court refused to
allow the lawyer any fee whatever from the trust estate on the ground
that the attorney general alone may represent charitable trusts. The
supreme court reversed, holding that, while the attorney general properly represents the beneficiaries of charitable trusts, this does not preclude employment of other counsel, when appropriate, by the trustees.
The court held, however, that the contingent fee contract was subject
to judicial approval as to fairness and allowed the lawyer only $2,500
instead of the $12,000 for which the contract provided.
Smith v. Haley52 was an application of the normal fiduciary rule

49. 319 S.W.2d 913 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959). Substantially contra Bank of Perryvile v. Kutz, 276 S.W.2d 593 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955); cf. Clabbey v. First Nat'l Bank,

320 S.W.2d 738 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959) in which a deposit by a mother in the names
of her son and herself was held to give no beneficial interest to the son. Compare
cases discussed in Fratcher, supra note 16, at 483-84.
50. So called from Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), a leading
case holding that a deposit in a savings bank in the name of the depositor as trustee
for another creates a revocable inter vivos trust which is neither testamentary nor
too indefinite as to terms for enforcement.
51. 314 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1958).
52. 314 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958). See also Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 316 S.W.2d
465 (Mo. 1958), in which trustees of a voting trust were enjoined from selling part
of the corporate stock held by them in trust to a corporation formed by some of
the trustees. Cf. Jackson v. Klein, 320 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1959).
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that a trustee may not acquire a personal interest in the trust property
without full disclosure to and consent by the trust beneficiaries. Parents
conveyed land to their daughter and son-in-law and took back a purchase money deed of trust for $1,650 running to a trustee. A default
having occurred, the father agreed orally to repurchase the land, took
possession and accidentally burned down the house on it. Thereafter the
deed of trust was foreclosed without actual notice to the daughter and
her husband. The father purchased the land at the foreclosure sale for
$400 and, half an hour later, conveyed to the trustee and his wife in
consideration of $600. The foreclosure and the conveyance to the trustee
and his wife were set aside at suit of the daughter and her husband.
The controversy in Coates v. Coates 53 arose out of a case discussed
last year 54 in which trustees of a testamentary trust sought and secured
a declaratory judgment that they acted properly in determining that
cccapital gain dividends" from investment company stock should be
treated as income. In the later case it was decided that, the ambiguity of
the provisions of the will having necessitated the original litigation, all the
parties thereto were entitled to reimbursement from the trust fund for
their expenses of litigation and that, these expenses being extraordinary,
should be paid from principal rather than from income. This decision
follows a modern trend toward charging non-routine costs of trust administration to principal.
Montgomery v. Snyder5" involved the special type of charitable
trust administered by trustees who hold property for an unincorporated
church. The church was of a denomination which follows the independent
congregational form of church government in which congregations belong to regional and national associations but are not subject to hierarchical control by these organizations. It was held that a majority of the
congregation could control the church property in shifting from one such
association to another so long as there was no departure from the basic
faith and doctrine to which the church was devoted when it was established.

53. 316 S.W.2d 875 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
54. Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957), Fratcher, supra note 16, at
487-88.
55. 320 S.W.2d 283 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958). The Freewill Baptist denomination; to
which the church in question belonged, had, according to the opinion, various regional and national associations with minor differences in procedure and organization.
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In SchofieId v. Commerce Trust Co.56 a testator devised the remainder in half his estate to a trustee for the upkeep and maintenance of a
son "and at his death, the residue, if any to be by the Trustee delivered
to my legal heirs. The Trustee may use the principal of corpus if necessary for the upkeep of my son."' 7 The trustee refused to pay the son more
than $100 a month, which was the income from the trust fund, although
his living expenses were some $380 a month. A judgment requiring the
trustee to pay the son $225 a month, using principal to the extent
necessary, was affirmed. The court failed to answer the trustee's contention that it should not have been ordered to pay a specific sum from
58
principal.
A case which was discussed at some length last year 9 was transferred to the supreme court.60 It involved the construction of a provision
in a will giving trustees a power to appoint a fifth share in income to the
descendants of a daughter of the testator or to other trust beneficiaries
who were absolutely entitled to the other four shares. As to this the will
stated, "It shall be entirely optional with the said trustees to give as much
or as little of the [fifth] ...share ... to [the descendants of the daughter] . . .as the trustees may deem proper."6' 1 The court of appeals held
that allocations of this share by the trustees must be within the bounds
of reasonable judgment. The supreme court held that the discretionary
power was not restricted to reasonable exercise and that "so long as the
trustees do not act arbitrarily, fraudulently, or in bad faith their actions
62
are not reviewable."

56. 319 S.W.2d 275 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
57. Id. at 276.
58. Cf. Winkel v. Streicher, 295 S.W.2d (Mo. 1956) (en bane); Fratcher,
supra note 28, at 405-06; In re Will of Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
59. Bakewell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 308 S.W.2d 341 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
60. Bakewell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 319 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1958) (en bane).
See RESTATEmwT, TRuSTS § 187, comment i (1935). The supreme court decided two
other interesting cases involving problems of trust administration during the period
under review. Old Folks Home of St. Louis County v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
313 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1958), was concerned with the liability, as between each other,
of beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust for inheritance tax assessed against the
estate of the settlor. Buder v. Walsh, 314 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. 1958), related to the right
of a trustee who has paid a surcharge for a breach of trust committed by both
trustees to obtain contribution from his co-trustee.
61. 319 S.W.2d at 603.
62. Id. at 606.
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In Anderson v. Stacker" a man paid the full consideration for a
conveyance of land to himself and a woman described in the conveyance
as his wife. This woman was living with him but was not his wife. It
was held that the two grantees took the legal title as equal tenants in
common but that the-woman held her half on resulting trust for the man.
The plaintiff in Jackson v. Tibbling64 was an elderly widow. She conveyed land, reserving a life estate, to a man who had been her husband's
and her friend for many years. The grantee agreed to execute a will
devising the land to the plaintiff if she survived him. He made such a
will but, while on his death bed, revoked it and conveyed the land to
his daughter, who then conveyed to the defendant, her mother. The court
held that the oral contract to make a will was unenforceable because of
the Statute of Frauds but that, because of the confidential relationship
beween plaintiff and the grantee, defendant held on constructive trust
for the plaintiff. In Wilber v. Wilber 5 a wife paid the entire consideration
for a conveyance of land. She had the conveyance run to herself and her
husband as tenants by the entireties, because her husband was ashamed
to live in a house owned by his wife, in reliance upon the husband's
promise that he would never claim any beneficial interest in the property. After their divorce the former husband asserted beneficial title
to an undivided half. It was decided that, because of their confidential
relationship, he held upon constructive trust for his former wife. Probably the same result could have been reached by means of the purchase
money resulting trust theory.
Chandler v. Howard8 involved a rooming house proprietress who
employed a lawyer to help her redeem her property from foreclosure of
two deeds of trust. At the lawyer's request, this client executed a prom-

63.

317 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1958). Purchase money resulting trusts were discussed

in Fratcher, supra note 28, at 407-10. The evidence was found insufficient to establish
purchase money resulting trusts in Ellis v. Williams, 312 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1958), and
Bennett v. Shaul, 318 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1958). Cf. March v. Gerstenschlager, 322 S.W.2d
743 (Mo. 1959), holding that a suit to establish a purchase money resulting trust of
land affects title to realty and, therefore, must be brought in the county where the

land is situated.
64. 310 S.W2d 909 (Mo. 1958). For a discussion of other Missouri cases relative
to the imposition of a constructive trust upon a grantee of land who agreed orally to
reconvey or to hold on trust for the grantor, see Fratcher, supra note 28, at 412-13.
65. 312 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1958).
66. 312 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1958).
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issory note to the lawyer's daughter in an amount equal to the balance
due on the two deeds of trust. The lawyer paid this amount to the holder
of the deeds of trust, obtained the notes which they secured, and had the
second deed of trust released of record. The lawyer later foreclosed the
first deed of trust for his own benefit. It was held that, in view of the
fiduciary relationship of lawyer and client, the lawyer held whatever
interest he had acquired by the transfer of these notes and deeds of trust
G7
upon constructive trust for his client. Similarly, in Johnson v. Blase
a tenant in common of land subject to two deeds of trust consulted a
lawyer in regard to the impending foreclosure of the second deed of
trust, on which there was some $850 due. The lawyer agreed to acquire
title at the foreclosure sale and reconvey to the client when reimbursed
for his expenses. The lawyer did acquire title through the foreclosure
sale. The client more than repaid the lawyer's expenses and also spent
substantial sums on improvements. It was held that the lawyer held upon
constructive trust for his client.

67. 322 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1959). This case involved, of course, two bases, which
all jurisdictions recognize, for the imposition of a constructive trust despite the fact
that the oral contract was within the Statute of Frauds: the fiduciary and confidential
relationship of lawyer and client and the fact that the lawyer took title for security
only. Cf. Poole v. Campbell, 289 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1956); Fratcher, supra note 28, at
412-13.
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